[funsec] Another WMF flaw without a Microsoft patch

Richard M. Smith rms at computerbytesman.com
Mon Jan 9 12:49:54 CST 2006


Yep, a DoS is relatively harmless in the whole scheme of things.  I know
literally of 100 other ways to DoS Internet Explorer.

However, what this latest problem points out is that Microsoft has still not
fully debugged the WMF file format in spite of learning about the first WMF
problem in March 2005 from eEye.  The bottom line here is that Microsoft
should turn off support for .WMF files in IE and stop marking .WMF files
safe for downloading in the Windows registry.

Richard 

-----Original Message-----
From: fergdawg at netzero.net [mailto:fergdawg at netzero.net] 
Sent: Monday, January 09, 2006 10:35 AM
To: rms at computerbytesman.com
Cc: funsec at linuxbox.org
Subject: Re: [funsec] Another WMF flaw without a Microsoft patch

Well, that's not good. :-)

But -- a DoS is better than a complete system compromise.

- ferg




-- "Richard M. Smith" <rms at computerbytesman.com> wrote:
 

-----Original Message-----
From: frankruder at hotmail.com [mailto:frankruder at hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 07, 2006 12:08 AM
To: bugtraq at securityfocus.com
Subject: Microsoft Windows GRE WMF Format Multiple Memory Overrun
Vulnerabilities

Microsoft Windows GRE WMF Format Multiple Memory Overrun Vulnerabilities

by cocoruder
page:http://ruder.cdut.net
email:frankruder_at_hotmail.com

Last Update:2006.01.07
class:design error
Remote:yes
local:yes

Product Affected:
Microsoft Windows XP SP2
Microsoft Windows XP SP1
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP1
Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Microsoft Windows ME
Microsoft Windows 98se
Microsoft Windows 98
Microsoft Windows 2000SP4

Vendor:
www.microsoft.com

Overview:
Microsoft Windows GRE(Graphics Rendering Engine) has been discovered
multiple memory overrun vulnerabilities while rendering WMF format
file.Users who view the malicious WMF format file will bring a denial of
service attack(explorer.exe will be restart).

Details:
there is 2 memory overrun vulnerabilities at least.

1.ExtCreateRegion call result in memory overrun vulnerability HRGN
ExtCreateRegion(
  CONST XFORM *lpXform,     // transformation data
  DWORD nCount,             // size of region data
  CONST RGNDATA *lpRgnData  // region data buffer );

WMFRECORD structure:
typedef struct _StandardMetaRecord
{
    DWORD Size;          /* Total size of the record in WORDs */
    WORD  Function;      /* Function number (defined in WINDOWS.H) */
    WORD  Parameters[];  /* Parameter values passed to function */ }
WMFRECORD;

the Parameters is likely about:
typedef	struct 	_Parameters
{
	char	unknow1[0x0a];
	WORD	All_PointtStruct_Num;	//the total following "
PointtStruct" number
	char	unknow2[0x0a];
	char	PointtStruct[];		//first  "PointtStruct"
}Parameters;

"PointtStruct"  structure:
typedef	struct 	_PointtStruct
{
	WORD	PointNum;		//
	WORD	Point[PointNum];	//
	char	unkonow[6];
}PointtStruct;

if we set 0xff to WMFRECORD.Function,PlayMetaFileRecord will compute the
memory which will be allocate later,as following:

.text:7F00FE07 loc_7F00FE07:                           ; CODE XREF:
PlayMetaFileRecord+1256j
.text:7F00FE07                 sub     eax, 3
.text:7F00FE0A                 jnz     loc_7F022B9A    ; 0xff
.text:7F00FE10                 movzx   ecx, word ptr [ebx+10h]	;get total
"PointtStruct" number
.text:7F00FE14                 mov     [ebp-88h], ecx		;save
.text:7F00FE1A                 test    ecx, ecx
.text:7F00FE1C                 jnz     short loc_7F00FE2E	;jmp 
.text:7F00FE1E                 xor     eax, eax
.text:7F00FE20                 push    eax             ; int
.text:7F00FE21                 push    eax             ; int
.text:7F00FE22                 push    eax             ; int
.text:7F00FE23                 push    eax             ; int
.text:7F00FE24                 call    CreateRectRgn
.text:7F00FE29                 jmp     loc_7F010494
.text:7F00FE2E ;
&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21
738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;
&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21
738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;&#21738;?
.text:7F00FE2E
.text:7F00FE2E loc_7F00FE2E:                           ; CODE XREF:
PlayMetaFileRecord+C15j
.text:7F00FE2E                 xor     edi, edi
.text:7F00FE30                 mov     [ebp-8Ch], edi
.text:7F00FE36                 lea     eax, [ebx+1Ch]		;get first
"PointtStruct" address
.text:7F00FE39                 mov     [ebp-90h], eax		;save
.text:7F00FE3F                 and     [ebp-94h], edi			
.text:7F00FE45                 and     [ebp-98h], edi
.text:7F00FE4B                 test    ecx, ecx
.text:7F00FE4D                 jbe     short loc_7F00FE8C		
.text:7F00FE4F
.text:7F00FE4F loc_7F00FE4F:                           ; CODE XREF:
PlayMetaFileRecord+C83j
.text:7F00FE4F                 movzx   ecx, word ptr [eax]	;get
PointNum,here will trigger memory access error**
.text:7F00FE52                 mov     edx, ecx				
.text:7F00FE54                 shr     edx, 1			;PointNum/2
.text:7F00FE56                 add     edx, edi			;sum
PointNum/2
.text:7F00FE58                 cmp     edx, edi
.text:7F00FE5A                 jb      loc_7F0106D5
.text:7F00FE60                 mov     edi, edx
.text:7F00FE62                 mov     [ebp-8Ch], edi
.text:7F00FE68                 cmp     ecx, 7FFFFFFBh
.text:7F00FE6E                 jnb     loc_7F0106D5
.text:7F00FE74                 lea     eax, [eax+ecx*2+8]
.text:7F00FE78                 inc     dword ptr [ebp-98h]	;counter+1
.text:7F00FE7E                 mov     ecx, [ebp-98h]
.text:7F00FE84                 cmp     ecx, [ebp-88h]		;cmp total
"PointtStruct" number
.text:7F00FE8A                 jb      short loc_7F00FE4F	;traverse
all "PointtStruct"
.text:7F00FE8C
.text:7F00FE8C loc_7F00FE8C:                           		; CODE XREF:
PlayMetaFileRecord+C46j
.text:7F00FE8C                                         		;
PlayMetaFileRecord+14D8j
.text:7F00FE8C                 cmp     dword ptr [ebp-94h], 0
.text:7F00FE93                 jnz     loc_7F022BA2
.text:7F00FE99                 cmp     edi, 0FFFFFFDh
.text:7F00FE9F                 jnb     loc_7F022BA2
.text:7F00FEA5                 mov     eax, [ebp-8Ch]
.text:7F00FEAB                 add     eax, 2
.text:7F00FEAE                 shl     eax, 4
.text:7F00FEB1                 mov     [ebp-9Ch], eax
.text:7F00FEB7                 push    eax             ; uBytes
.text:7F00FEB8                 push    0               ; uFlags
.text:7F00FEBA                 call    ds:LocalAlloc		;will
allocate memory normally.
.text:7F00FEC0                 mov     edi, eax

so when we set "Parameters.All_PointtStruct_Num","PointtStruct.PointNum" big
enough,but not many enough "PointtStruct" structure,will trigger a memory
access error on 7F00FE4F.


2.ExtEscape POSTSCRIPT_INJECTION result in memory overrun vulnerability int
ExtEscape(
  hdc,                  // handle to DC (HDC)
  POSTSCRIPT_INJECTION, // nEscape param of ExtEscape
  cbInput,              // size of input buffer
  lpszInData,           // pointer to input (PSINJECTDATA *)
  0,                    // cbOutput param of ExtEscape
  NULL                  // lpszOutData param of ExtEscape
);

we can control cbInput and szInData,so when we set cbInput big enough(like
0xffff),but set szInData very small,will trigger a memory access
error(7F027358) likely.

.text:7F027312 loc_7F027312:                           ; CODE XREF:
ExtEscape+11Ej
.text:7F027312                                         ; ExtEscape+12Aj
.text:7F027312                 test    byte ptr [ecx+4], 40h
.text:7F027316                 jnz     loc_7F017CEC
.text:7F02731C                 mov     ebx, [ebp+arg_8]		;we can
cotrol this:cbSize
.text:7F02731F                 add     ebx, 1Ah			;cbSize+0x1a
.text:7F027322                 and     ebx, 0FFFFFFFCh
;cbSize+0x1a-4
.text:7F027325                 mov     eax, large fs:18h
.text:7F02732B                 mov     eax, [eax+30h]
.text:7F02732E                 push    ebx
.text:7F02732F                 push    0
.text:7F027331                 push    dword ptr [eax+18h]
.text:7F027334                 call    ds:RtlAllocateHeap	;allocate
memory size=cbSize+0x16
.text:7F02733A                 test    eax, eax
.text:7F02733C                 jz      short loc_7F027385
.text:7F02733E                 mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:7F027341                 mov     [eax+0Ch], ecx
.text:7F027344                 mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:7F027347                 mov     [eax+10h], ecx
.text:7F02734A                 mov     edx, ecx
.text:7F02734C                 shr     ecx, 2
.text:7F02734F                 sub     ebx, 8
.text:7F027352                 mov     [eax+8], ebx
.text:7F027355                 lea     edi, [eax+14h]
.text:7F027358                 rep movsd			;copy,here
will trigger a memory error likely**
.text:7F02735A                 mov     ecx, edx
.text:7F02735C                 and     ecx, 3
.text:7F02735F                 rep movsb
.text:7F027361                 mov     ecx, [ebp-4]
.text:7F027364                 mov     edi, [ebp+arg_14]
.text:7F027367                 lea     edx, [ecx+48h]
.text:7F02736A                 mov     esi, [edx+4]
.text:7F02736D                 mov     [eax+4], esi

Exploit:
first vul can test like this:
  ...05020000FF0044444444444444444444FFFF33333333333333333333FFFF41424344...
second vul can test like this:
  ...0502000026001610FFFF4444444444444444...
my blog can not be opened now:p,i will upload the exploit files to
xfocus(www.xfocus.net) later,have fun:)

Solution:
Microsoft has not develop the patch,please unregister the Windows Picture
and Fax Viewer (Shimgvw.dll)(see MS06-001).

Thanks:
thanks all my friends,Happy Weekday:)

-EOF-

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